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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, in two separate cases Damian Ayarzagoitia pled guilty to
one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon enhancement, one count of misdemeanor
malicious injury to property, three counts of misdemeanor petit theft, and one count of burglary.
He received an aggregate unified sentence of forty years, with twenty years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Ayarzagoitia contends that this aggregate sentence represents an abuse of
the district court’s discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts. He further contends
that the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of the
additional information submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter,
Rule 35) motions. Mr. Ayarzagoitia further contends that the district court abused its discretion
by ordering the full amount of restitution in light of his inability to pay.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Supreme Court Docket No. 44958 (Ada County district court case number 2016-7003
(hereinafter, the aggravated battery case)) and Supreme Court Docket No. 44968 (Ada County
district court case number 2016-31420 (hereinafter, the burglary case)) have been consolidated
for appellate purposes. (R., p.2.)
In the aggravated battery case, in the early morning hours of May 30, 2016, Ryan Garcia
Larrimore was stabbed approximately four times about the head and neck with a small knife.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) Each wound was approximately 1 cm
in length. (PSI, p.3.) A man came forward and confessed that he and two friends accosted
Mr. Garcia Larrimore. (PSI, p.4.) After stabbing Mr. Garcia Larrimore, they had him get into a
nearby pond to clean up. (PSI, p.4.) After bathing, Mr. Garcia Larrimore was provided with
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clean clothes, but his backpack, clothes, and shoes were thrown into the pond by the three
assailants. (PSI, p.4.) Damian Ayarzagoitia was identified as one of the men responsible. (PSI,
p.4.) Apparently, a leader in the homeless community had put a “green light” on Mr. Garcia
Larrimore, presumably this meant that others in the homeless community were obliged to harm
him. (PSI, pp.4-5.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Ayarzagoitia was charged by information with aggravated
battery with a deadly weapon enhancement and a persistent violator sentencing enhancement as
Mr. Ayarzagoitia had prior felony convictions. (R., pp.54-55, 72-73, 81-82.)
In the burglary case, police were contacted on May 26, 2016, by a business owner about a
burglary and vandalism. (PSI, p.5.) A surveillance video showed that Mr. Ayarzagoitia and a
friend had entered the business, which had been cleaned by a company for which
Mr. Ayarzagoitia used to work, using a spare key he had made. (PSI, pp.5-6.) While inside the
business, Mr. Ayarzagoitia and his friend took a laptop computer and poured substances on
surfaces and equipment in the office. (PSI, p.5.) Mr. Ayarzagoitia was charged by information
with one count of burglary, one count of misdemeanor malicious injury to property, and three
counts of petit theft. (R., pp.238-239.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Ayarzagoitia pled guilty to one count of burglary and
one count of aggravated battery. (12/1/16 Tr., p.30, L.5 – p.31, L.1; R., pp.115-124, 246-255.)
Initially, as a condition of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor
charges in the burglary case; however, Mr. Ayarzagoitia wanted to take responsibility for all of
his actions, and insisted on pleading guilty to the misdemeanor charges as well as the felony
charges. (12/1/16 Tr., p.6, L.21 – p.9, L.4; p.32, L.10 – p.34, L.5.) In exchange, the State agreed
to dismiss the persistent violator enhancement. (12/1/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-20; R., pp.123, 254.)
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There was no agreement as to sentencing recommendations. (12/1/16 Tr., p.6, L.10 – p.7, L.11;
R., pp.123, 254.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to sentence Mr. Ayarzagoitia
to forty years. (3/17/17 Tr., p.50, Ls.3-13; p.74, Ls.11-20.) Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s counsel asked
the district court to place Mr. Ayarzagoitia in a mental hospital or to impose a fixed sentence of
ten years, leaving to the court’s discretion the amount of consecutive, indeterminate time.
(3/17/17 Tr., p.83, L.14 – p.84, L.8; p.91, L.21 – p.92, L.2.) Mr. Ayarzagoitia asked the district
court to “impose what [the prosecutor]’s asking for.1 (3/17/17 Tr., p.92, L.23 – p.93, L.5.)
Mr. Ayarzagoitia was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of forty years, with twenty
years fixed. (3/17/17 Tr., p.94, L.17 – p.95, L.2; R., pp.133, 159, 263-267, 289-293.) The court
gave the State until August 17, 2017, to submit a restitution request. (3/17/17 Tr., p.46, Ls.3-24.)
Although the State failed to submit a restitution request within the time allotted by the court, the
district court overruled the defendants’ timeliness objections and set the matter for a restitution
hearing. (8/24/17 Tr., p.6, L.3 – p.8, L.22.) After a restitution hearing, the court ordered
Mr. Ayarzagotia to

pay $59,283.32,

(Augmentation, pp.35-37.)

jointly and severally with his

co-defendants.

The court determined the CVCP was owed $25,000.00 of the

$59,283.32 total, for payments it had made to the medical providers. (1/26/18 Tr., p.36, Ls.2-4;
Augmentation, pp.35-37.)

1

Mr. Ayarzagoitia apparently misunderstood the State’s request for a fixed sentence of forty
years. Notably, the prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation to the district court did not contain
the word “fixed” but asked the court to “impose all 40 of those years” or “to impose the full max
sentence of 40 years.” (3/17/17 Tr., p.50, Ls.14-15.) Further, Mr. Ayarzagoitia suffers from
ADHD and other mental health conditions which may have impacted his ability to understand
what the prosecutor was asking the court to do. (PSI, p.17.)
3

Mr. Ayarzagoitia then filed timely pro se Rule 35 motions asking the district court to
reconsider the sentence in light of his serious mental health conditions. (R., pp.163-170, 299302.) Mr. Ayarzagoitia asked the court to reduce his aggregate sentence to twenty years, with
ten years fixed, and to suspend execution of the sentence in order to commit him to a state
hospital for treatment. (R., pp.166, 169.) The district court denied Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s Rule 35
motions without a hearing. (R., pp.182-189, 313-320.) Mr. Ayarzagoitia filed pro se notices of
appeal timely from the judgment of conviction and the district court’s order denying his Rule 35
motions. (R., pp.137-141, 175-179, 268-272, 308-312.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate unified sentence
of forty years, with twenty years fixed, upon Mr. Ayarzagoitia following his pleas of
guilty to one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon sentencing enhancement,
one count of misdemeanor malicious injury to property, three counts of misdemeanor
petit theft, and one count of burglary?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motions?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering Mr. Ayarzagoitia to pay restitution
to the Crime Victims Compensation Program?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Unified Sentence Of
Forty Years, With Twenty Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Ayarzagoitia Following His Pleas Of Guilty
To Aggravated Battery With A Deadly Weapon, Misdemeanor Malicious Injury To Property,
Three Counts Of Petit Theft, And Burglary
Mr. Ayarzagoitia asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of forty
years, with twenty years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing
court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent
review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App.
1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Ayarzagoitia does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory
maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Ayarzagoitia must show
that in light of the governing criteria, the sentences were excessive considering any view of the
facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s sentence is
excessive considering any view of the facts.
At sentencing, Mr. Ayarzagoitia was only 39 years old, but he has long struggled to
manage his mental health conditions. (PSI, p.3, 16-18; 3/17/17 Tr., p.77, L.17 – p.83, L.16.)
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Mr. Ayarzagoitia has been diagnosed with ADHD, Intermittent Explosive Behavior Disorder,
Tourette’s Syndrome, and Borderline Personality Disorder. (PSI, pp.16-18.) He also has a
learning disability.

(PSI, p.17.)

Mr. Ayarzagoitia was first diagnosed with mental health

conditions when he was eight years old, and his childhood was spent in psychiatric hospitals and
facilities. (PSI, pp.14-15, 17-18.) During his childhood, beginning before he was four years old,
Mr. Ayarzagoitia was physically abused, first by his father and then his step-father. (PSI, pp.1415, 17.)

Even during his multiple confinements in psychiatric facilities as a child,

Mr. Ayarzagoitia was physically abused—during one such stay his arm was broken, at a different
facility his femur was broken. (PSI, pp.17-18.) The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the trial
court must consider a defendant’s mental illness as a factor at sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132
Idaho 573, 581 (1999).
Mr. Ayarzagoitia expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions. (PSI,
p.4; 12/1/16 Tr., p.30, L.5 – p.34, L.5; 3/17/17 Tr., p.88, Ls.5-17.) Mr. Ayarzagoitia insisted on
pleading guilty to all of the charged offenses, and he wanted the court to know that he wanted to
take responsibility for his wrongs. (12/1/16 Tr., p.8, L.24 – p.11, L.8; PSI, p.20.) At his
sentencing hearing, Mr. Ayarzagoitia asked the prosecutor to tell the victim that he was sorry.
(3/17/17 Tr., p.100, Ls.3-5.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant
expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Ayarzagoitia asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the
district court properly considered his remorse and serious mental illnesses, it would have
imposed a less severe sentence.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s Rule 35 Motions
For Sentence Reduction In Light Of The New Information Offered In Support Of His Rule 35
Motions
Although Mr. Ayarzagoitia contends that his sentence is excessive in light of the
information in front of the district court at the time of his March 17, 2017 sentencing hearing
(see Part I, supra), he asserts that the excessiveness of his sentences is even more apparent in
light of the new information submitted in conjunction with Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s Rule 35 motions.
Mr. Ayarzagoitia asserts that the district court’s denial of his motions for sentence modifications
represents an abuse of discretion.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of
new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction.” Id.
In support of his motions for a sentence reduction, Mr. Ayarzagoitia submitted new
information regarding the management of his mental health conditions. Mr. Ayarzagoitia is now
on medication, a mood stabilizer, but will otherwise not receive mental health treatment while
incarcerated. (R., p.165.) Further, he was denied housing in the Behavioral Health Unit (where
offenders with serious mental health issues are typically housed). (R., p.165.) Mr. Ayarzagoitia
expressed his concern that, without treatment, he might reoffend. (R., p.165.) Mr. Ayarzagoitia
asked the court to reduce his sentences from forty years, with twenty years fixed, to twenty
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years, with ten years, fixed.

(R., p.166.)

In light of this new information regarding

Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s mental health conditions, the district court should have reduced his sentences.
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district court at
the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce
Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s sentences in response to his Rule 35 motions.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Ayarzagoitia To Pay Restitution To
The CVCP
A.

Introduction
Mr. Ayarzagoitia asserts the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay

restitution to the (Crime Victims Compensation Program (hereinafter, CVCP)). Specifically, he
contends the district court failed to exercise reason in its decision because the district court did
not give sufficient weight to Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s financial resources, earning ability, and the
parameters of the CVCP.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Ayarzagoitia To Pay
Restitution To The CVCP
The decision regarding whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within
the district court’s discretion and is guided by consideration of the factors set
forth in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7). State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37
(Ct. App. 2002). The issue of causation in restitution cases is a question of fact to
be decided by the trial court. See Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875 (2009).
The district court’s factual findings with regard to restitution will not be disturbed
on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819,
822 (Ct. App. 2010).

State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011). Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919,
393 P.3d 576, 579 (2017) (quoting State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013)).

9

“To determine whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court evaluates
whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with relevant legal standards; and (3)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Ayarzagoitia To Pay
Restitution Even Though He Had No Ability To Pay
“‘The decision regarding whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the

district court’s discretion,’ guided by factors in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7).” State v. Hurles,
158 Idaho 569, 573 (2015) (quoting State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011)). The statute
provides that the district court “shall” consider:
the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the
financial resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other
factors as the court deems appropriate. The immediate inability to pay restitution
by a defendant shall not be, in and of itself, a reason to not order restitution.
I.C. § 19-5304(7). While the statute provides that “immediate inability to pay” shall not alone be
a reason to not order restitution, in Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s case, there are additional reasons which
make it apparent that the district court failed to reach its decision by an exercise in reason in
ordering Mr. Ayarzagoitia to pay $25,000.00 in restitution to the CVCP.
In its written ruling, the district court recognized Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s present inability to
pay the substantial restitution amount, but reasoned, “the present ability to pay is not a critical
factor in determining whether a defendant should be ordered to pay restitution.” (Augmentation,
p.43.) The district court considered the future earning potential and the severe injuries and
trauma to the victim, holding that “the Defendants’ present inability to pay does not preclude a
restitution order in this case.” (Augmentation, p.43.) The district court abused its discretion in
failing to consider Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s mental illness, his receipt of disability income due to his
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mental illness, the voluntary nature of CVCP payments, and the availability of funds to the
CVCP from sources other than defendants’ restitution payments.
Mr. Ayarzagoitia was sentenced to forty years of imprisonment, with twenty years fixed,
at the age of thirty-nine. (R., pp.133-134; PSI, p.3.) He will be eligible for parole when he is
fifty-nine, but it is entirely possible he will be incarcerated until he is seventy-nine. (R., pp.133134.) During his incarceration, “he is prevented from earning any significant amounts of money
for restitution.” State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543 (Ct. App. 1989). When he is released from
prison, his advanced age will likely make it very difficult for him to find gainful employment.
Further, he will likely have to disclose his felony convictions, which also limits his employment
options. Along with these hurdles, Mr. Ayarzagoitia has significant mental health issues. He has
been diagnosed with ADHD, Tourette’s Syndrome, Borderline Personality Disorder, and with a
learning disability.

(PSI, pp.16-18.)

These circumstances greatly limit, if not completely

foreclose, Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s current and future earning ability.

In fact, Mr. Ayarzagoitia

receives Social Security Disability for his mental illness, and he has been unable to work for
most of his life. (PSI, pp.17, 19.) The district court should have given more weight to these
factors in its restitution decision. In light of the significance of these factors, Mr. Ayarzagoitia
asserts the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay, jointly and severally with
his co-defendants, $25,000.00 in restitution to the CVCP.

D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Ayarzagoitia To Pay
Restitution Where The CVCP’s Payments Were Discretionary And The CVCP Receives
Alternative Sources Of Income
“Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes the sentencing court to order a defendant to pay

restitution for economic loss to the victim of a crime.” State v. McNeil, 158 Idaho 280, 283
(Ct. App. 2014). “Victim” means the “directly injured victim,” which in turn means “a person . .
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. . who suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct and shall
also include the immediate family of a minor . . . .” I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e). Economic loss
“includes, but is not limited to, . . . . direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical
expenses resulting from the criminal conduct . . . .” I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a). The definition of
“victim” includes the CVCP, “(e) “Victim” shall mean: . . . (iii) The account established pursuant
to the crime victims compensation act, chapter 10, title 72, Idaho Code, from which payment was
made to or on behalf of a directly injured victim pursuant to the requirements of Idaho law as a
result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.”

“Economic loss shall be based upon the

preponderance of evidence submitted to the court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim or
presentence investigator. . . . [T]he court may consider such hearsay as may be contained in the
presentence report, victim impact statement or otherwise provided to the court.” I.C. § 195304(6).
Article I, section 22 of the Idaho Constitution denotes a constitutional guarantee of crime
victims’ rights as created by statute, and states that victims are entitled “[t]o restitution, as
provided by law, from the person committing the offense that caused the victim's loss.” Idaho
Const. art. I, § 22.
Mr. Ayarzagoitia recognizes that I.C. § 19-5304 provides that CVCP can be identified as
a “victim” and the statute contains language regarding that organization’s entitlement to
restitution payments. I.C. § 19-5304. However, Ms. Leah Little from the CVCP testified that
the CVCP is not required to pay on behalf of an injured person. (1/26/18 Tr., p.50, Ls.1-11.)
Further, the CVCP has three funding sources: (1) a federal block grant; (2) fees assessed from
misdemeanor and felony defendants; and (3) recovery from criminal defendants paying
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restitution. (1/26/18 Tr., p.45, L.12 – p.46, L.23.) In this case, the CVCP voluntarily paid the
medical care providers directly. (1/26/18 Tr., p.50, Ls.1-11.)
As Mr. Ayarzagoitia asserted at the restitution hearing:
I’ve asked my attorney to explain something as far as an objection to the payment
of the Victim’s Compensation Fund on the basis of the Victim’s Compensation
Fund made a paid [sic] to the hospital voluntarily. I didn’t commit a crime
against the Victim’s Compensation Fund. I do not believe that I should be
ordered to pay them.
I understand that I’d have to pay the hospital and I agree to that. But as far as
paying the Victim’s Compensation Fund, they chose voluntarily to do that and
there’s no state law requiring them to do that.
(1/26/18 Tr., p.74, Ls.4-14.)2
Ultimately, CVCP’s decision to pay was discretionary and where Mr. Ayarzagoitia does
not have the present or future ability to pay, and the CVCP obtains funding from other sources
such as a federal block grant and fines assessed of misdemeanor and felony defendants, he
asserts that the district court abused its discretion in ordering him jointly and severally liable for
compensation to the CVCP for $25,000.

2

The prosecutor acknowledged that Mr. Ayarzagoitia’s argument was sound, differentiating
between “somebody that suffers and economic loss” and should be compensated versus
“somebody that just chooses to pay out money.” (1/26/18 Tr., p. 74, L.25 – p.75, L.6.)
13

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ayarzagoitia respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motions be vacated
and the cases remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Alternatively,

Mr. Ayarzagoitia requests that this Court reduce or vacate the district court’s restitution order
and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of May, 2018.
___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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